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RECENT DECISIONS
be delayed until his death? It is possible to imply from the will an intention
to exclude the husband from the remainder, but this is an exclusionary not a
donative intent. An intention to delay the determination of the distributees cannot
even be implied from the will. Without a showing of intention to delay, as
distinguished from an intention to exclude, the distributees should be determined
at testarix's death, whether or not the husband is excluded from those distributees.
A contrary result would fly in the face of testatrix's presumed intention, the rule
of early vesting, and the policy reasons behind that rule. In all, it would seem that
the grounds for excluding the husband in this case are weak, but the grounds for
delaying the determination of the distributees are almost nonexistent. On the
latter ground, if not the former, this case is a serious departure from existing law.
Alan Vogt
Defamation in Political Radio Broadcasts: More Grist for the Mill
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act provides in effect that, when
radio time is granted to a candidate for a political office, the station must grant
the use of its facilities under substantially the same conditions to opposing can-
didates.' Censorship of the speeches is forbidden but no station is required to
grant time for political speeches initially.2 A primary candidate for U.S. Senator
made use of a station following his opponent's speech. He and the radio station
were sued for libel. Held: The radio station is immune from suit since in,
prohibiting censorship, Congress could not have intended that a radio station
should be held liable for speech or statement over which it could have no controLC
Defamation by radio is generally determined by the law of libel, although
in some instances it has been construed to constitute slander or a completely new
and different tort.
4
Suits against radio stations for defamatory remarks made by political speakers
have been comparatively few and have resulted in conflicting rules. The diver-
gence of opinion may be attributed both to different interpretations of section 315
1. 48 STAT. 1088 (1943), 47 U.S.C. §315 (1946).
2. Ibid.
3. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F.Supp. 928 (M. D. Tenn 1958).
4. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 340, 243 N.W. 82 (1932) (libel); Hartmann
v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947) (libel, material read from script);
Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Mfisc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (Sup.Ct. 1937) aff'd mem. 253
App.Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938) (slander, ad lib); Summit Hotel v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939) (ad lib, held neither
libel nor slander, but a different kind of defamation). A discussion of whether
defamation by radio is libel or slander is beyond the scope of the note. For a
general discussion, see Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34
IowA L. R. 12 (1948). For argument that it is neither libel nor slander, see
Newhouse, Defamation by Radio; A New Tort, 17 ORE. L.R. (1939).
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and to application by state courts of either strict liability5 or negligence theories
to defamation by radio.
The first case in this area was Sorensen v. Wood T which arose under circum-
stances almost identical to those of the present case, in the state courts of Nebraska.
There, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held for the plaintiff on the theory that
the non-censorship provision applied only to "words as to their political and
partisan trend" and did not give radio station licensees any privilege to join in
publication of a libel or grant any immunity from the consequences of such action.
The conclusion was based upon the analogy to newspaper liability for defama-
tion.8 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that the state court decision was based upon a non-federal ground sufficient
to support it.9
Until very recently, the majority of courts have tended to follow the
Sorenson doctrine.10 The exceptions to the rule have generally arisen in states
which have been unwilling to adopt the analogy of strict liability imposed upon
5. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 340, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
6. Summit Hotel v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302
(1939); Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 737, 38 N.Y.S.2d
985 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
7. 123 Neb. 340, 243 N.W. 82 (1932). This case concerned §18 of the Federal
Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1162 (1927), which is almost identical to §315 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.
8. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §581; PROSSER, TORTS §94 (1955); HARPER AND JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS, §5.5 (1956). The plaintiffs attorney on appeal was Professor
Lawrence Vold of the University of Nebraska who subsequently wrote an article
substantiating the holding of the court. See Vold, Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN.
L.R. 611 (1935).
9. Appeal denied sub nom. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 29 U.S. 599
(1933). It has been pointed out in Donnelly, op cit. supra note 4, that of the
eight cases citel by the Supreme Court of the United tSates -in support of dis-
missal, two of them were cases where there was no bona fide dispute, Cleveland
v. Chamberlain, 1 Black 419 (U.S. 1861); East Tenn. V. & G. R.R. v. Southern
Telegraph, 125 U.S. 695 (1887); two involved controversies that had become
moot, Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32 (1924);
and four hinged upon a section of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 115b, 28 U.S.C.
§344 (1946), authorizing the review of state court decisions which question the
validity of a federal treaty, or state statute which questions the validity of a
federal treaty or statute, or which hold valid a state statute where its
invalidity has been asserted on federal . grounds, Live Oak Water Users'
Ass'n. v. R.R. Comm. 269 U.S. 354 (1926), Girard Trust Co. v. Ocean & Lake
Realty, 286 U.S. 523 (1923), Wagner v. Leenhousts, 287 U.S. 571- (1932), Real
Estate, Land, T. & T. v. Springfield, 287 U.S. 577 (1932). Consequently, Professor
Donnelly concludes that the dismissal could have been based on any one of three
grounds, viz: (1) no real dispute between the parties, (2) moot question, or (3)
the decision of the Nebraska court did not hold invalid any part of the Radio
Act of 1927 or other federal statute, but merely held that the Radio Act was
inapplicable, the case being disposed of entirely upon the Nebraska common
law of libel.
10. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 889 (W.D.M. 1934); Irwin
v. Ashhurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938j; Singler v. Journal Co.. 218 Wis.
263, 260 N.W. 431 (1935); Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
None of these cases deal with political broadcasts but all follow the strict liability
analogy laid down in Sorensen.
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newspapers. The few exceptions have applied a negligence theory, 1 and one court
has required malice on the part of the radio station.12 Although section 315 is
sometimes mentioned in them, the cases generally have been decided on other
grounds. The first voice raised against the Sorenson doctrine, at least as to the
applicability of section 315 as a defense to libel actions, was in the Port Huron
case' 3 before the Federal Communications Commission in 1948. The petitioning
radio station was before the commission for renewal of its license and was
opposed by some local politicians who claimed that section 315 had been violated
by the station's cancellation of a contract for radio time. Petitioner defended on
the ground that the material intended for broadcast was libelous. The commission
took the view that this was censorship despite the libelous nature of the material,
but nevertheless granted the license renewal since it was not an intentional
violation of section 315. It then declared the intent of Congress in enacting
section 315 and its predecessor to be that the non-censorship provision was
absolute and that a radio station had a correlative immunity from suit for
defamation broadcast in the speech. The commission went into a long discussion
of the relative merits of alleviating the station's dilemma by allowing censorship
of material which might possibly be libelous on the one hand, and of granting
immunity from liability on the other. Considering the possibility of abuse of
the censorship privilege and the importance of complete dissemination of ideas in
the political arena, the commission felt immunity to be the better solution and
therefore found such to have been the congressional intent. Support for the
theory that Congress had power to grant such immunity was drawn from the
words of Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.:
14
"The prohibition of a Federal statute may not be set at naught or its
benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules. The
doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins is inapplicable to those areas of judicial
decisions within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the
sweep of Federal statutes that legal relations which they affect may be
deemed governed by Federal law having its source in those statutes rather
than by local law."
Further support was drawn from O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph
11. Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co. supra note 6; Summit
Hotel v. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 4. The rationale of the negligence
theory is based upon the idea that newspapers have greater control over what
is published than do radio stations, plus the element of governmental control of
radio stations.
12. Charles Parker Co., v. Cilver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d
440 (1955). This was a political broadcast.
13. In re Application of Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
14. 317 U.S. 173 (1942). Sola Electric was a suit involving the challenge
by a licensee under a patent, of the validity of the patent. The conflict was be-
tween the common law rule that a licensee is estopped to challenge the validity
of a patent and the prohibition of the Sherman Act against price fixing, which
the licensing agreement attempted to accomplish.
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Co.,15 a suit for damages in connection with a defamatory telegram transmitted
over Western Union's facilities. There it was held that the company's liability
must be determined by Federal statute rather than local law, Congress having
occupied the field by a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation.
Shortly after the decisicn in Port Huron'6 was announced, this position
was challenged. The Houston Post Co., which owned some radio stations in
Texas, brought a suit against the Unite i States under section 4 02a of the Federal
Communications Act' to annul the order construing section 315 in Port Huron.
The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the Port Huron dictum
was not an order and that the plaintiff could not be hurt thereby. The court then
went on to criticize the Port Huron case, saying:
"If the Supreme Court of the United States had authoritatively so con-
strued §315; if short of this there were a body of decisions uniformly
so construing it; if in general, prohibitions against censorship had been
uniformly construed as precluding the control of language which is be-
yond the scope of guarantees of free speech; or if the legislative history
of the section clearly showed the path of the law to be that which the
commission, in its opinion, has taken; then there might be some basis
for the claim that, though in form a mere opinion as to the meaning of
the section, the pronouncement was in fact and in law intended to be,
and was, an order laying down a positive rule of law."
"When, however, it appears: that the Supreme Court has not construed
the section, that there is no body of judkial opinion interpreting it as
the F. C. C. has done, but such opinion as there is is directly to the
contrary,'8 and that prohibitions of censorship have been uniformly held
not to prevent the control of language which is beyond the guarantees of
free speech, the view that the commission was issuing an order and not
merely giving an opinion seems unfounded."
"When it further appears from the legislative history of the Communica-
tions Act not that Congress has, but that Congress has not given any
clear indication that in using the word "censorship" in §315, it intended
to give it the-meaning given by the F. C. C.'s interpretation, the con-
tention that the expression of the F. C. C.'s opinion on such a contro-
15. 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). There is a possible distinguishing feature
here in that telegraph companies are considered common carriers who must
accept all traffic, whereas, normally, radio stations can pick and choose their
customers.
16. Supra note 13.
17. 48 STAT. 926 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §402a (1952), as amended 48 STAT. 1093
(1934), 50 STAT. 197 (1937), 63 STAT. 108 (1949, 66 STAT. 718 (1952). This section
is the procedure by which an order of the F.C.C. may be enjoined, set aside,
annulled or suspended.
18. E.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 889 F.Supp. 889, (W.D. Mo.
1934); Irwin v. Ashhurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938); Singler v. Journal
Co., 218 Wis. 263, 260 N.W. 431 (1935); Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d
847 (1933); McDonald v. Polk, 346 Mo. 615, 142 S.W.2d 635 (1940); Holden v.
American News Co., 53 F.Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
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versial and difficult matter was intended to be and was an order under
§402a seems far fetched."'19
Despite this scathing attack, in a case almost identical to Port Huron20 ap-
pearing before the F. C. C. on application for renewal of a license, the F. C. C.
permitted the renewal because it felt that the station had acted in good faith and
on the advise of legal counsel. However, it added, sticking to the same guns as in
Port Huron:
(W) e will. ... in the future consider that there is no open question
with respect to censorship on the part of licensees of material broad-
cast under §315, and licensees will be expected to abide strictly by the
provisions of that section."2'1
More recently, the Supreme Court of North Dakota jumped on the Port
Huron bandwagon in Farmer' Union v. WDAY, Inc.,22 a case similar in its
facts to the present case. The plaintiff has taken the case to the U. S. Supreme
Court where it is now awaiting disposition.
2
3
The Port Huron case2 4 and those which have adopted its rationale rely upon
what is claimed to be the intent of Congress as derived from the legislative history
of the section. Investigation of the Congressional Record shows this conclusion
to be erroneous, as was pointed out in the Houston Post case.25
Section 315 was taken over without change from section 18 of the Radio
Act of 1927.26 The Senate draft of section 18 contained a provision for im-
munity of licensees,2 7 but doubt was expressed as to the power of Congress fo
19. Houston Post Co. v. U.S., 79 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
20. Supra note 13.
21. In re Matter of VDSU Broadcasting Corp., 7 Pike & Fischer Radio
Reg. 769 (1951). It has been suggested that despite the "no obligation" clause of
§315 (i.e. that no station is required to accept political speeches in the first place)
it is doubtful that the F.C.C. would endorse a policy of not permitting candidates
to speak in view of the public service function which radio stations are supposed
to fulfill. Note, 61 YALE L.J. 87, n.4 (1952).
22. Farmers Educational and Co-operative Union of America, North Dakota
Division v. WDAY, Inc., 89 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1958). There is a North Dakota
statute which protects radio stations from suits for defamatory statements made
during any broadcast by anyone other than the owner or staff. N. D. REVISED CODE
§14-0209, Supp. N.D.R.C. 1943. The defendant raised it but plaintiff demurred, the
trial court sustaining the demurrer. Defendant took no exception, so it was not in
issue on appeal. As yet, its constitutionality has not been tested.
23. Certiorari granted 79 S.Ct. 56 (1958). Docket No. 248, Oct 13, 1958. No
hearing scheduled as of time of writing.
24. Supra note 13.
25. Supra note 19.
26. 44 STAT. 1162 (1937).
27. H. R. 9971, §4, 69th Cong. 1st Sess., 67 Cong. Rec. 12356, 12502-505 (1926).
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grant it. The legislative history of the 1934 Act does not reveal any considera-
tion of the problem and section 315 followed section 18 practically verbatim.
A number of solutions to the dilemma have been suggested by members of
Congress from time to time, bur none has ever reached the voting stage. In 1935,
Representative Scott of California introduced a bill which would have amended
section 315 far beyond the needs of the present problem. 28 The White bill in
194729 was somewhat less extensive -ut still would protect radio stations from
suits resulting from defamatory political broadcasts. The O'Hari bill in 1952
would have afforded equal opportunity to all candidadtes but would adopt the
other approach to protection by prohibiting only partisan censorship, the radio
station not being required to broadcast defamatory material. None of these bills
has been passed into law and the dilemma of the station owners remains.80 The
mnodus operandi of the F. C. C. has been strongly criticized in this area on the
ground that it is regulating program content through its supervisory power
rather than through its powers of adjudication and rule making8 1 Since most of
the cases before the F. C. C. in this area arise in renewal of licenses, a decision
which will guide other applicants in the future is, of course, necessary. Generally,
these decisions are not judicially reviewable8 2 Although these methods may suffice
for F. C. C. purposes, the dicta announced in the cases would appear to be weak
authority for a decision concerning an actual legal controversy which involves
money damages.
The problem is not so bad as it would appear on the surface, however, since
28. H. R. 9229, 9230, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., 79 Cong. Rec. 14399 (1935):
"Each licensee of a radio broacasting station shall be required to
set aside regular and definite times for uncensored discussion on a
nonprofit basis, of public, social, political and economic problems....
and for any controversial issue it shall permit at least one advocate
of each opposing viewpoint equivalent facilities. . . . , Provided that
the licensees shall have no power of censorship of any kind nor shall
any licensee be subject to liability, civil or criminal, in any state or
Federal court for material so broadcast under the provisions of this
section.... ;" Rep. Scott stated that his purpose was to extend the
provisions of §315 to speakers other than political candidates and also
to protect stations from suit.
29. S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (1947):
"§14(a). If any licensee shall permit any qualified candidate for
public office.... to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunity to all other candidates for that office....
(d) The licensee of any station so used shall have no power to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section: Provided;
that licensees shall not be liable in any local, state, or Federal court
because of any material broadcast under the provisions of this section
except as to such material as may be personally uttered by the
licensee or persons under his control."
30. H.R. 7782, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952).
31. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW, §41, p.143 (1951).
32. Ibid.
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in addition to the jurisdictions adopting the negligence rule,a3 more than thirty
states have adopted statutes which in one way or another give protection to the
radio stations. Some states have adopted a "due care" provision into their de-
famation-by-radio statutes3 4 while others simply grant immunity to radio stations
in regard to broadcasts made under section 315.35 By either of these methods, the
problem of the scope of section 315, at least as to liability, is obviated.
David C. F'iding
Excludability of Quarters Allowance From Gross Income for Tax Purposes
The taxpayer, a doctor employed by the Veteran's Adminstration, occupied
quarters on hospital grounds owned by his employer. He was required, as a
condition of his employment, and in order to perform his duties, to live on the
grounds. Under authority of V. A. manuals, rental charges for the quarters oc-
cupied by the taxpayer were withheld from his official basic salary before he re-
ceived it. Thus, instead of his full official salary, the taxpayer received an amount
representing the difference between the official salary and the rental value of
the premises. Under V. A. Regulations, the rental charges were considered part
of taxpayer's compensation, and the V. A. was to be reimbursed for the cost of
furnishing quarters to employees by means of payroll deductions. In 1954 and
1955 the taxpayer also made direct rental payments for the use of a garage on
the hospital premises. On appeal from a Tax Court decision,' refusing to allow
33. E.g. New York (Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., suprra
note 6); Pennsylvania (Summit Hotel v. N.B.C. supra note 6), Connecticut
(Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., supra note 12).
34. ARiz. REV. STATS. §12-652 (1952); CAL. Civ. CODE §48.5 (1949); COLO. STAT.
ANN. c. 138B §1 (supp. 1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. §770.04 (cum.supp. 1957); GA.
CODE ANN. §105-712 (cum. supp. 1957); IoWA CODE ANN. §659.5 (1949); KANS. LAws
1949 c. 320 §1;LA. REV. STAT. tit. 45 §1351 (1950); ME. LAws 1949 c. 134; MICH.
STAT. ANN. §27.1406 (1957 supp.); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§64-205-64-207 (1947)
requires malice in addition to the due care requirement; MINN. STATS. c. 544.043
(1957); Miss. AcTs 1954; NEB. REV. STAT. §§86-601-86-603 (1959 re-issue); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§41.340-41.360 (1957); N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9915 (cum.supp. 1949);
OHIO REV. CODE §2739.03 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §30.150 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 §1583 (1953); S.D. LAwS 1949 c. 206; TEx CIV. STAT. §5433a (1953 supp);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§45-2-5-45-2-10 (1953 supp.); VA. CODE ANN. §8-632.1 (1950);
WASH. REV. CODE §§19.64.010-19.64020 (1952), limited to ad libs and then only if
speaker is cut off the air immediately; W. VA. CODE §5482(1) (1955); Wyo. COMP.
STAT. §§3-8203-3-8204 (1957 cum.supp.).
35. ARK. STATS. §3-1606 (1954 supp.); IDAHO CODE §6-701 (1951 cum. supp.);
MD. LAwS, ART. 75, §19A (1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. §537-105 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12 § §1585, 1586 (1953); S.C. CODE OF LAWS §237 (1953 supp.). The same approach
is taken in the "due care" statutes of the following states: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Virginia and
Wyoming. See supra note 36. For a discussion of state legislation up to 1951,
see Remmer,, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio,*64 HARV. L.R.
727 (1951), also published in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, University
of Michigan Law School, Legislative Research Center, Ann Arbor, 1952.
1. 29 T.C. 813, CCH, Dec. 22, 829 (1958).
